MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame
defimported Lean
The strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation - payment vector - true type profile - agent index
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {A P V U : Type*} in variable (M : MechanismWithTransfers I T A P) in def MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) (trueTypes : ∀ i, T i) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame I U
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame← MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:107): adapted
What was changed in
MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame--- EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:107 (MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,11 +1,8 @@ -/-- The strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. - - Utility is supplied as a function of: - - allocation - - payment vector - - true type profile - - agent index -/ -def toStrategicGame +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {A P V U : Type*} in +variable (M : MechanismWithTransfers I T A P) in +def MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) - (trueTypes : ∀ i, T i) : StrategicGame I U where + (trueTypes : ∀ i, T i) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame I U where strategy := T - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
- Used by 10
- Auction.FirstPrice.gameFirst-price auction as a strategic game. This is also the game induced by
mechanismviaMechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame; see… - SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game reserve vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism reserve. - Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism. The payoffs agree becausepaymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0,… - SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSICMyerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
- Auction.SecondPrice.gameSecond-price auction as a strategic game. This is also the game induced by
mechanismviaMechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame; see… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSICPointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
- MechanismWithTransfers.isDSICDSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
- MechanismWithTransfers.toQuasiLinearGameThe standard quasi-linear specialization of
toStrategicGame. - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwichFor a DSIC single-parameter mechanism, fixing all other bids yields the standard two-sided bound on payment differences.
- Auction.FirstPrice.gameFirst-price auction as a strategic game. This is also the game induced by
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {A P V U : Type*} in variable (M : MechanismWithTransfers I T A P) in /-- The strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation - payment vector - true type profile - agent index -/ def MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) (trueTypes : ∀ i, T i) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame I U where strategy := T payoff r i := u (M.allocationRule r) (M.paymentRule r) trueTypes i