AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

game v equals the strategic game induced by mechanism. The payoffs agree because paymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0, so the utility is v i - b i for the winner and 0 for losers.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Auction Auction.FirstPrice in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
variable {v : I → U} in
omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
lemma Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame (v : I → U) :
    game v = mechanism.toStrategicGame
      (fun (w : I) (pay : I → U) (vals : I → U) (i : I) => if i = w then vals i - pay i else 0)
      v
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
What was changed in Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
--- EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/FirstPrice.lean:171 (Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame)
+++ as compiled here
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
+set_option autoImplicit true in
+set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
+open Auction Auction.FirstPrice in
+variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
+variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
+variable {v : I → U} in
 omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
-/-- `game v` equals the strategic game induced by `mechanism`.
-
-  The payoffs agree because `paymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0`,
-  so the utility is `v i - b i` for the winner and `0` for losers. -/
-lemma game_eq_toStrategicGame (v : I → U) :
+lemma Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame (v : I → U) :
     game v = mechanism.toStrategicGame
@@ -13,2 +15,2 @@
   simp [utility, winner]
-  split_ifs <;> rfl
+  split_ifs <;> simp_all
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 8
  • EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players N and utilities in U. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
  • Auction.FirstPrice.gameFirst-price auction as a strategic game. This is also the game induced by mechanism via MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame; see…
  • MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation -…
  • Auction.FirstPrice.mechanismThe first-price auction as a MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids in U (their type space is homogeneous: T i = U). -…
  • Auction.FirstPrice.utilityUtility of bidder i in a first-price auction: winner gets v i − b i (pays own bid), losers get 0.
  • MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. - I — agents - T — report/type space of each agent - A — allocation space - P — payment space…
  • Auction.FirstPrice.winnerThe winner of the first-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses Auction.argmaxBid from…
  • Auction.argmaxBidThe bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Auction Auction.FirstPrice invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] invariable {v : I → U} inomit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in/-- `game v` equals the strategic game induced by `mechanism`. The payoffs agree because `paymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0`, so the utility is `v i - b i` for the winner and `0` for losers. -/lemma Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame (v : I → U) :    game v = mechanism.toStrategicGame      (fun (w : I) (pay : I → U) (vals : I → U) (i : I) => if i = w then vals i - pay i else 0)      v := by  unfold game mechanism MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame  congr 1  funext b i  simp [utility, winner]  split_ifs <;> simp_all
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