Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
game v equals the strategic game induced by mechanism. The payoffs agree because paymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0, so the utility is v i - b i for the winner and 0 for losers.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Auction Auction.FirstPrice in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {v : I → U} in omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame (v : I → U) : game v = mechanism.toStrategicGame (fun (w : I) (pay : I → U) (vals : I → U) (i : I) => if i = w then vals i - pay i else 0) v
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame← Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/FirstPrice.lean:171): adapted
What was changed in
Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame--- EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/FirstPrice.lean:171 (Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open Auction Auction.FirstPrice in +variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in +variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in +variable {v : I → U} in omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in -/-- `game v` equals the strategic game induced by `mechanism`. - - The payoffs agree because `paymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0`, - so the utility is `v i - b i` for the winner and `0` for losers. -/ -lemma game_eq_toStrategicGame (v : I → U) : +lemma Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame (v : I → U) : game v = mechanism.toStrategicGame @@ -13,2 +15,2 @@ simp [utility, winner] - split_ifs <;> rfl + split_ifs <;> simp_all - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - Auction.FirstPrice.gameFirst-price auction as a strategic game. This is also the game induced by
mechanismviaMechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame; see… - MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation -…
- Auction.FirstPrice.mechanismThe first-price auction as a
MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids inU(their type space is homogeneous:T i = U). -… - Auction.FirstPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
iin a first-price auction: winner getsv i − b i(pays own bid), losers get0. - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - Auction.FirstPrice.winnerThe winner of the first-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom… - Auction.argmaxBidThe bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Lean source view module on GitHub
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Auction Auction.FirstPrice invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] invariable {v : I → U} inomit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in/-- `game v` equals the strategic game induced by `mechanism`. The payoffs agree because `paymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0`, so the utility is `v i - b i` for the winner and `0` for losers. -/lemma Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame (v : I → U) : game v = mechanism.toStrategicGame (fun (w : I) (pay : I → U) (vals : I → U) (i : I) => if i = w then vals i - pay i else 0) v := by unfold game mechanism MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame congr 1 funext b i simp [utility, winner] split_ifs <;> simp_all