AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism

defimported Lean

The reserve second-price auction as a MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids in U. The allocation is none when the reserve is not met, and some i when bidder i receives the item.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
variable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in
noncomputable def Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism (reserve : U) :
    MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => U) (Option I) U
Defined in
EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 3
Used by 7

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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
variable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in
/-- The reserve second-price auction as a `MechanismWithTransfers`. Agents report bids in `U`. The allocation is `none` when the reserve is not met, and `some i` when bidder `i` receives the item. -/
noncomputable def Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism (reserve : U) :
    MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => U) (Option I) U where
  allocationRule b := allocation reserve b
  paymentRule b i := if allocation reserve b = some i then clearingPrice reserve b else 0
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