Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRule
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRule
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in @[simp] lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRule (reserve : U) (b : I → U) (i : I) : (mechanism reserve).paymentRule b i = if allocation reserve b = some i then clearingPrice reserve b else 0
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRule`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRule← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRule (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:299): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 5
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanismThe reserve second-price auction as a
MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids inU. The allocation isnonewhen the reserve is… - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocationThe item is sold exactly when the winning bid meets the reserve.
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPriceThe price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_allocationRuleAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_allocationRule
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanismThe reserve second-price auction as a
- Used by 5
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_of_allocation_eq_someThe allocated bidder pays the clearing price.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game reserve vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism reserve. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_of_allocation_ne_someA bidder who is not allocated the item pays zero.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_someThe allocated bidder never pays more than her reported bid.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_eq_zero_of_allocation_eq_noneIf the item is withheld, every bidder pays zero.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in @[simp] lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRule (reserve : U) (b : I → U) (i : I) : (mechanism reserve).paymentRule b i = if allocation reserve b = some i then clearingPrice reserve b else 0 := rfl