Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
game reserve v equals the strategic game induced by mechanism reserve.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame (reserve : U) (v : I → U) : game reserve v = (mechanism reserve).toStrategicGame (fun (w : Option I) (pay : I → U) (vals : I → U) (i : I) => if w = some i then vals i - pay i else 0) v
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:335): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 10
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanismThe reserve second-price auction as a
MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids inU. The allocation isnonewhen the reserve is… - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
i: the allocated bidder receives value minus the clearing price; all others receive0. - MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation -…
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocationThe item is sold exactly when the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.gameReserve second-price auction as a strategic game.
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPriceThe price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_allocationRuleAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_allocationRule
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRuleAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRule
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanismThe reserve second-price auction as a
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] invariable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} inomit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in/-- `game reserve v` equals the strategic game induced by `mechanism reserve`. -/lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame (reserve : U) (v : I → U) : game reserve v = (mechanism reserve).toStrategicGame (fun (w : Option I) (pay : I → U) (vals : I → U) (i : I) => if w = some i then vals i - pay i else 0) v := by unfold game mechanism MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame congr 1 funext b i simp [utility] split_ifs <;> rfl