Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loser
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loser
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loser {b : I → U} {i : I} (h : allocation reserve b ≠ some i) : utility reserve v b i = 0
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loser`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loser← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loser (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:223): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 3
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
i: the allocated bidder receives value minus the clearing price; all others receive0. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocationThe item is sold exactly when the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPriceThe price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
- Used by 2
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonnegTruthful bidding yields nonnegative utility.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantTruthful bidding dominates any other bid in the reserve second-price auction.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loser {b : I → U} {i : I} (h : allocation reserve b ≠ some i) : utility reserve v b i = 0 := if_neg h