AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.valuation_is_dominant

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Truthful bidding dominates any other bid in the reserve second-price auction.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
variable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in
theorem Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.valuation_is_dominant (reserve : U) (v : I → U) (i : I) (b : I → U) :
    utility reserve v b i ≤ utility reserve v (Function.update b i (v i)) i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.valuation_is_dominant`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 10

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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] invariable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in/-- Truthful bidding dominates any other bid in the reserve second-price auction. -/theorem Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.valuation_is_dominant (reserve : U) (v : I → U) (i : I) (b : I → U) :    utility reserve v b i ≤ utility reserve v (Function.update b i (v i)) i := by  let bTruth := Function.update b i (v i)  by_cases hcurrent : allocation reserve b = some i  · rw [utility_winner hcurrent]    by_cases htruth : allocation reserve bTruth = some i    · rw [utility_winner htruth]      have hcurrent_price :          clearingPrice reserve b = max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i) :=        clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_some hcurrent      have htruth_price :          clearingPrice reserve bTruth = max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i) := by        calc          clearingPrice reserve bTruth              = max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding bTruth i) :=                clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_some htruth          _ = max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i) := by                simp [bTruth, Auction.maxBidExcluding_update_self]      rw [hcurrent_price, htruth_price]    · rw [utility_loser htruth]      have hthreshold :          v i ≤ clearingPrice reserve b := by        have hprice :            clearingPrice reserve b = max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i) :=          clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_some hcurrent        have hle :            v i ≤ max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i) := by          simpa [bTruth] using            bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self reserve b i (v i) htruth        simpa [hprice] using hle      exact sub_nonpos.mpr hthreshold  · rw [utility_loser hcurrent]    exact utility_nonneg (reserve := reserve) (v := v)      (b := Function.update b i (v i)) (i := i) (by simp)
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