Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility
defimported Lean
Utility of bidder i: the allocated bidder receives value minus the clearing price; all others receive 0.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in noncomputable def Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility (reserve : U) (v b : I → U) (i : I) : U
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:213): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocationThe item is sold exactly when the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPriceThe price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price.
- Used by 6
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loserAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loser
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game reserve vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism reserve. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_winnerAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_winner
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonnegTruthful bidding yields nonnegative utility.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantTruthful bidding dominates any other bid in the reserve second-price auction.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.gameReserve second-price auction as a strategic game.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in /-- Utility of bidder `i`: the allocated bidder receives value minus the clearing price; all others receive `0`. -/ noncomputable def Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility (reserve : U) (v b : I → U) (i : I) : U := if allocation reserve b = some i then v i - clearingPrice reserve b else 0