Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonneg
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Truthful bidding yields nonnegative utility.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonneg {b : I → U} {i : I} (htruth : b i = v i) : 0 ≤ utility reserve v b i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonneg`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonneg← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonneg (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:227): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loserAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loser
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_winnerAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_winner
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
i: the allocated bidder receives value minus the clearing price; all others receive0. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocationThe item is sold exactly when the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_someWhen the item is sold, the clearing price is no more than the allocated bidder's bid.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPriceThe price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price.
- Used by 1
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantTruthful bidding dominates any other bid in the reserve second-price auction.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] invariable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in/-- Truthful bidding yields nonnegative utility. -/lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonneg {b : I → U} {i : I} (htruth : b i = v i) : 0 ≤ utility reserve v b i := by by_cases halloc : allocation reserve b = some i · rw [utility_winner halloc, sub_nonneg, ← htruth] exact clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some halloc · simp [utility_loser halloc]