AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonneg

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Truthful bidding yields nonnegative utility.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
variable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in
lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonneg {b : I → U} {i : I} (htruth : b i = v i) :
    0 ≤ utility reserve v b i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonneg`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 6
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] invariable {reserve : U} {v : I → U} in/-- Truthful bidding yields nonnegative utility. -/lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonneg {b : I → U} {i : I} (htruth : b i = v i) :    0 ≤ utility reserve v b i := by  by_cases halloc : allocation reserve b = some i  · rw [utility_winner halloc, sub_nonneg, ← htruth]    exact clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some halloc  · simp [utility_loser halloc]
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