Auction.maxBid
defimported Lean
The highest bid in a profile.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] {V : Type*} [LinearOrder V] in variable (b : I → V) in @[simp] def Auction.maxBid : V
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.maxBid`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.maxBid← Auction.maxBid (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/AuctionBasic.lean:202): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 12
- Auction.bid_le_maxBidEvery bid is at most the argmax bidder's bid.
- Auction.argmaxBidThe bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest…
- Auction.maxBidExcluding_le_maxBidExcluding any bidder can only decrease the highest bid.
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winnerThe winner's bid is at least the second price.
- Auction.SecondPrice.bid_winner_eq_maxBidAuction.SecondPrice.bid_winner_eq_maxBid
- Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
b, replacingi's bid withv idoes… - Auction.maxBidExcluding_le_argmaxBid_bidThe argmax bidder's bid is at least the highest bid among all others.
- Auction.SecondPrice.maxBidExcluding_eq_maxBid_if_loserAuction.SecondPrice.maxBidExcluding_eq_maxBid_if_loser
- Auction.maxBidExcluding_eq_maxBid_of_not_argmaxIf
iis not the argmax bidder, excludingidoes not change the highest bid. - Auction.argmaxBid_eq_maxBidThe argmax bidder's bid equals the highest bid.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_selfAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self
- Auction.exists_maxBidThere exists a bidder whose bid equals the highest bid.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] {V : Type*} [LinearOrder V] in variable (b : I → V) in /-- The highest bid in a profile. -/ @[simp] def Auction.maxBid : V := Finset.sup' Finset.univ Finset.univ_nonempty b