AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
omit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self
    (reserve : U) (b : I → U) (i : I) (bi : U)
    (hnot : allocation reserve (Function.update b i bi) ≠ some i) :
    bi ≤ max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i)
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 9
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] inomit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] inlemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self    (reserve : U) (b : I → U) (i : I) (bi : U)    (hnot : allocation reserve (Function.update b i bi) ≠ some i) :    bi ≤ max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i) := by  let b' := Function.update b i bi  by_cases hsell : reserve ≤ b' (SecondPrice.winner b')  · have halloc : allocation reserve b' = some (SecondPrice.winner b') := by      simp [allocation, hsell]    have hwin_ne : SecondPrice.winner b' ≠ i := by      intro h      exact hnot (by simpa [b', h] using halloc)    have hb_le_winner : b' i ≤ b' (SecondPrice.winner b') := by      simpa [SecondPrice.winner] using Auction.bid_le_maxBid b' i    have hmax_eq : Auction.maxBidExcluding b' i = Auction.maxBid b' := by      exact Auction.maxBidExcluding_eq_maxBid_of_not_argmax b'        (by simpa [SecondPrice.winner] using hwin_ne.symm)    have hle_excluding' : bi ≤ Auction.maxBidExcluding b' i := by      have hbid_winner_eq_max : b' (SecondPrice.winner b') = Auction.maxBid b' := by        simpa [SecondPrice.winner] using Auction.argmaxBid_eq_maxBid b'      rw [hmax_eq, ← hbid_winner_eq_max]      simpa [b'] using hb_le_winner    have hupdate : Auction.maxBidExcluding b' i = Auction.maxBidExcluding b i := by      simpa [b'] using Auction.maxBidExcluding_update_self b i bi    have hle_excluding : bi ≤ Auction.maxBidExcluding b i := by      simpa [hupdate] using hle_excluding'    exact le_trans hle_excluding (le_max_right reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i))  · have hbid_le_reserve : bi ≤ reserve := by      have hb_le_winner : b' i ≤ b' (SecondPrice.winner b') := by        simpa [SecondPrice.winner] using Auction.bid_le_maxBid b' i      have hwinner_le_reserve : b' (SecondPrice.winner b') ≤ reserve :=        le_of_lt (lt_of_not_ge hsell)      simpa [b'] using le_trans hb_le_winner hwinner_le_reserve    exact le_trans hbid_le_reserve (le_max_left reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i))
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