Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self (reserve : U) (b : I → U) (i : I) (bi : U) (hnot : allocation reserve (Function.update b i bi) ≠ some i) : bi ≤ max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:175): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- Auction.bid_le_maxBidEvery bid is at most the argmax bidder's bid.
- Auction.argmaxBidThe bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest…
- Auction.maxBidExcluding_update_selfChanging
i's bid does not affect the highest bid among the others. - Auction.maxBidExcludingThe highest bid excluding bidder
i. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocationThe item is sold exactly when the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.maxBidExcluding_eq_maxBid_of_not_argmaxIf
iis not the argmax bidder, excludingidoes not change the highest bid. - Auction.argmaxBid_eq_maxBidThe argmax bidder's bid equals the highest bid.
- Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom… - Auction.maxBidThe highest bid in a profile.
- Used by 1
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantTruthful bidding dominates any other bid in the reserve second-price auction.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] inomit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] inlemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self (reserve : U) (b : I → U) (i : I) (bi : U) (hnot : allocation reserve (Function.update b i bi) ≠ some i) : bi ≤ max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i) := by let b' := Function.update b i bi by_cases hsell : reserve ≤ b' (SecondPrice.winner b') · have halloc : allocation reserve b' = some (SecondPrice.winner b') := by simp [allocation, hsell] have hwin_ne : SecondPrice.winner b' ≠ i := by intro h exact hnot (by simpa [b', h] using halloc) have hb_le_winner : b' i ≤ b' (SecondPrice.winner b') := by simpa [SecondPrice.winner] using Auction.bid_le_maxBid b' i have hmax_eq : Auction.maxBidExcluding b' i = Auction.maxBid b' := by exact Auction.maxBidExcluding_eq_maxBid_of_not_argmax b' (by simpa [SecondPrice.winner] using hwin_ne.symm) have hle_excluding' : bi ≤ Auction.maxBidExcluding b' i := by have hbid_winner_eq_max : b' (SecondPrice.winner b') = Auction.maxBid b' := by simpa [SecondPrice.winner] using Auction.argmaxBid_eq_maxBid b' rw [hmax_eq, ← hbid_winner_eq_max] simpa [b'] using hb_le_winner have hupdate : Auction.maxBidExcluding b' i = Auction.maxBidExcluding b i := by simpa [b'] using Auction.maxBidExcluding_update_self b i bi have hle_excluding : bi ≤ Auction.maxBidExcluding b i := by simpa [hupdate] using hle_excluding' exact le_trans hle_excluding (le_max_right reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i)) · have hbid_le_reserve : bi ≤ reserve := by have hb_le_winner : b' i ≤ b' (SecondPrice.winner b') := by simpa [SecondPrice.winner] using Auction.bid_le_maxBid b' i have hwinner_le_reserve : b' (SecondPrice.winner b') ≤ reserve := le_of_lt (lt_of_not_ge hsell) simpa [b'] using le_trans hb_le_winner hwinner_le_reserve exact le_trans hbid_le_reserve (le_max_left reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i))