BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupport
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupport
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupport {A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I} (h : A.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions B) (i : I) : Set.EqOn (fun v => (B.interimAllocProb i v * v - ∫ z in 0..v, B.interimAllocProb i z) * A.typeDensity i v) (fun v => B.interimAllocProb i v * A.virtualValue i v * A.typeDensity i v + B.interimAllocProb i v * (1 - (A.typeData.cdf i).cdf v) - (∫ z in 0..v, B.interimAllocProb i z) * A.typeDensity i v) (Set.uIoc 0 (A.typeData.omega i))
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupport`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupport← BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupport (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:1744): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 32
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptionsCDF assumptions for the interim virtual-surplus comparison.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValueMyerson virtual value
v - (1 - F_i(v)) / f_i(v)for bidderi. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensityAgent
i's one-dimensional density, defined as the derivative of the stored CDFFᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasPositiveDensityOnSupport.nonzero_on_supportBayesianSingleItemAuction.HasPositiveDensityOnSupport.nonzero_on_support
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- TypeCDFA scalar type distribution on the interval
[0, ω], recorded by its CDF. - ContinuousTypeProfileAgent-specific continuous private-value data.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 2
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelope_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelope_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegral_eq_virtualSurplusIntegralBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegral_eq_virtualSurplusIntegral
Lean source view module on GitHub
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} intheorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupport {A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I} (h : A.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions B) (i : I) : Set.EqOn (fun v => (B.interimAllocProb i v * v - ∫ z in 0..v, B.interimAllocProb i z) * A.typeDensity i v) (fun v => B.interimAllocProb i v * A.virtualValue i v * A.typeDensity i v + B.interimAllocProb i v * (1 - (A.typeData.cdf i).cdf v) - (∫ z in 0..v, B.interimAllocProb i z) * A.typeDensity i v) (Set.uIoc 0 (A.typeData.omega i)) := by intro v hv have hv' : v ∈ Set.Ioc 0 (A.typeData.omega i) := by simpa [Set.uIoc_of_le (A.typeData.cdf i).omega_nonneg] using hv have h0 : 0 < v := hv'.1 have homega : v ≤ A.typeData.omega i := hv'.2 have homega_lt_or_eq : v < A.typeData.omega i ∨ v = A.typeData.omega i := lt_or_eq_of_le homega rcases homega_lt_or_eq with homega_lt | rfl · have hdens_ne : A.typeDensity i v ≠ 0 := h.positive_density_on_support.nonzero_on_support A h0 homega_lt simp [virtualValue, mul_sub, sub_mul, mul_assoc, div_eq_mul_inv, hdens_ne] · have hFω : (A.typeData.cdf i).cdf (A.typeData.omega i) = 1 := (A.typeData.cdf i).cdf_upper have hsurv_zero : 1 - (A.typeData.cdf i).cdf (A.typeData.omega i) = 0 := by rw [hFω] ring simp [virtualValue, hsurv_zero, sub_mul]