BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue
defimported Lean
Myerson virtual value v - (1 - F_i(v)) / f_i(v) for bidder i.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (i : I) (v : ℝ) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue← BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:72): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 17
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensityAgent
i's one-dimensional density, defined as the derivative of the stored CDFFᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- TypeCDFA scalar type distribution on the interval
[0, ω], recorded by its CDF. - ContinuousTypeProfileAgent-specific continuous private-value data.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 57
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_nonpos_of_forall_lt_reserveThresholdIf all reports are below reserve, the winning virtual value is nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasEnvelopeVirtualSurplusUpperBoundEnvelope-term revenue is bounded by interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue_nonpos_of_lt_isReserveThresholdBelow a reserve threshold, the virtual value is nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_interim_virtual_surplus_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_interim_virtual_surplus_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.integrableVirtualSurplusBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.integrableVirtualSurplus
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winningVirtualValue_pos_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winningVirtualValue_pos_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue_pos_of_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_oneA bidder allocated probability
1has positive virtual value. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toInterimFubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toInterimFubini
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularRegularity: every bidder's virtual value is monotone.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isReserveThreshold_of_isRegular_of_virtualValue_eq_zeroA zero of a regular virtual value is a reserve threshold.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptionsCDF assumptions for the interim virtual-surplus comparison.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_totalAllocation_mul_winningVirtualValueBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_totalAllocation_mul_winningVirtualValue
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_self_mono_of_isRegularBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_self_mono_of_isRegular
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusUpperBoundInterim-payment revenue is bounded by interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_envelope_upperBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_envelope_upper
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_forall_virtualValue_nonposIf all virtual values are nonpositive, withhold the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValueThe virtual value attained by the selected virtual-value winner.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasEnvelopeVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_analyticAssumptionsBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasEnvelopeVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_analyticAssumptions
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_leThe selected winner is exactly the bidder whose lexicographic virtual score dominates every other bidder's score.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualScore_le_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualScore_le_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_of_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_of_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormulaBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_nonpos_iff_forall_virtualValue_nonposThe winning virtual value is nonpositive iff all virtual values are.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedInterimVirtualSurplusEx-ante virtual surplus through interim allocation probabilities.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptionsFubini hypotheses connecting ex-ante and interim expressions.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_neBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_ne
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_iff_exists_virtualValue_posA sale occurs exactly when some bidder has positive virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegularUnder regularity, the deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is monotone in the sense required by…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.aestronglyMeasurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimAllocationIntegrandBayesianSingleItemAuction.aestronglyMeasurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimAllocationIntegrand
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reserveThreshold_le_bid_of_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_oneAn allocated bidder reports at least her reserve threshold.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScoreLexicographic score used to break ties among virtual values.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_comp_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_comp_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_iff_forall_virtualValue_nonposWithholding is equivalent to all virtual values being nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelope_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelope_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_pos_iff_exists_virtualValue_posThe winning virtual value is positive iff some virtual value is positive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue_nonneg_of_isReserveThresholdAt a reserve threshold, the virtual value is nonnegative.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.intervalIntegrable_interimAllocProb_mul_virtualValue_mul_typeDensity_of_profileSplit_integrableProduct-side virtual-surplus integrability gives interval integrability of the density-weighted interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_iff_winningVirtualValue_nonposWithholding is equivalent to nonpositive winning virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptionsType-measure Fubini hypotheses.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubini
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptionsAnalytic assumptions for MSZ 12.59.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualValue_of_isRegularRegular virtual values are measurable by Mathlib's measurability theorem for monotone real functions.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.envelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions_of_environmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.envelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions_of_environment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegral_eq_virtualSurplusIntegralBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegral_eq_virtualSurplusIntegral
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_virtualValue_geThe selected winner has maximal virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsReserveThresholdA reserve threshold separating nonpositive and nonnegative virtual values.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusVirtual surplus of an allocation rule at a reported type profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_iff_winningVirtualValue_posA sale occurs exactly when the selected virtual value is positive.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Myerson virtual value `v - (1 - F_i(v)) / f_i(v)` for bidder `i`. -/ noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (i : I) (v : ℝ) : ℝ := v - (1 - (A.typeData.cdf i).cdf v) / A.typeDensity i v