BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmong
defimported Lean
Expected seller-revenue optimality among candidates.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in def BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmong [Fintype I] (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (Candidate : BayesianSingleItemAuction I → Prop) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmong`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmong← BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmong (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:2523): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 27
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironmentExpected seller revenue of
B, evaluated in environmentA. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 8
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueComparableRevenue optimality among revenue-comparable candidates.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuctionRegular Myerson optimality among feasible IC/IR mechanisms.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimal
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueUpperBoundedRevenue optimality under the one-sided revenue upper bound.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Expected seller-revenue optimality among candidates. -/ def BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmong [Fintype I] (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (Candidate : BayesianSingleItemAuction I → Prop) : Prop := Candidate B ∧ ∀ C, Candidate C → A.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment C ≤ A.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment B