BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment
defimported Lean
Expected seller revenue of B, evaluated in environment A.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment [Fintype I] (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment← BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:891): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 16
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedPaymentRevenueInEnvironmentExpected total payment revenue under the base prior.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 16
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueComparableRevenue optimality among revenue-comparable candidates.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentityEx-ante revenue agrees with the interim-payment expression.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_of_expectedVirtualSurplus_leVirtual-surplus comparison gives revenue comparison under identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBoundExpected revenue is bounded above by expected virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBounded
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_identityBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_identity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentityExpected revenue equals expected virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongExpected seller-revenue optimality among candidates.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueUpperBoundedRevenue optimality under the one-sided revenue upper bound.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Expected seller revenue of `B`, evaluated in environment `A`. -/ noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment [Fintype I] (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : ℝ := A.expectedPaymentRevenueInEnvironment B.paymentRule