BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hzero : B.IsZeroNormalized) (hpay_formula : B.HasInterimPaymentFormula) : ∀ i : I, (∫ v in 0..A.typeData.omega i, B.interimExpectedPayment i v * A.typeDensity i v) = ∫ v in 0..A.typeData.omega i, (B.interimAllocProb i v * v - ∫ z in 0..v, B.interimAllocProb i z) * A.typeDensity i v
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula← BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:2669): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 33
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
0gives payment0, holding the other reports fixed. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimPaymentFormula[MSZ 12.49] Payment identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalizedA zero-normalized payment rule has zero interim expected payment at type
0. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensityAgent
i's one-dimensional density, defined as the derivative of the stored CDFFᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPaymentInterim expected payment
m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- ContinuousTypeProfileAgent-specific continuous private-value data.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormulaBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} intheorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hzero : B.IsZeroNormalized) (hpay_formula : B.HasInterimPaymentFormula) : ∀ i : I, (∫ v in 0..A.typeData.omega i, B.interimExpectedPayment i v * A.typeDensity i v) = ∫ v in 0..A.typeData.omega i, (B.interimAllocProb i v * v - ∫ z in 0..v, B.interimAllocProb i z) * A.typeDensity i v := by intro i have hM0 : B.interimExpectedPayment i 0 = 0 := B.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalized hzero i refine intervalIntegral.integral_congr_ae ?_ filter_upwards with v _hv have hpay := hpay_formula i v rw [hM0] at hpay calc B.interimExpectedPayment i v * A.typeDensity i v = (B.interimAllocProb i v * v - ∫ z in 0..v, B.interimAllocProb i z) * A.typeDensity i v := by rw [hpay] ring