BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalized
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
A zero-normalized payment rule has zero interim expected payment at type 0.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalized [DecidableEq I] (B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hzero : B.IsZeroNormalized) (i : I) : B.interimExpectedPayment i 0 = 0
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalized`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalized← BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalized (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:1072): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 32
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
0gives payment0, holding the other reports fixed. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_eq_integral_interimPaymentIntegrandThe generic interim expectation specializes to the payment integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrandPayment integrand for interim payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPaymentInterim expected payment
m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- OpponentTypeProfileOpponent type profiles for real-valued auction types.
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfileThe reported type profile obtained by combining
zᵢwith an opponent profilet₋ᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - SingleParameterMechanism.ZeroNormalizedZero normalization for payment rules: reporting
0yields payment0, holding the other reports fixed. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
- Used by 2
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormulaBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormulaUnder the interim envelope formula and nonnegative envelope increments, zero normalization implies support-restricted interim IR.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- A zero-normalized payment rule has zero interim expected payment at type `0`. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalized [DecidableEq I] (B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hzero : B.IsZeroNormalized) (i : I) : B.interimExpectedPayment i 0 = 0 := by have hpoint : (fun t : OpponentTypeProfile I i => B.interimPaymentIntegrand i 0 t) = fun _ => 0 := by funext t have hz := hzero i (reportProfile i 0 t) simpa [IsZeroNormalized, SingleParameterMechanism.ZeroNormalized, interimPaymentIntegrand] using hz rw [B.interimExpectedPayment_eq_integral_interimPaymentIntegrand i 0, hpoint] simp