AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_eq_and_equilibriumPayoff_eq_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

[MSZ 12.50] Same q_i and zero-type payment give the same interim objects.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BayesianSingleItemAuction in
open MeasureTheory in
variable {I : Type*} in
theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_eq_and_equilibriumPayoff_eq_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula
    (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I)
    (henvA : A.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula) (henvB : B.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula)
    (i : I)
    (hQ : ∀ z : ℝ, A.interimAllocProb i z = B.interimAllocProb i z)
    (hM0 : A.interimExpectedPayment i 0 = B.interimExpectedPayment i 0)
    (v_i : ℝ) :
    A.interimExpectedPayment i v_i = B.interimExpectedPayment i v_i ∧
      A.equilibriumPayoff i v_i = B.equilibriumPayoff i v_i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_eq_and_equilibriumPayoff_eq_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 21

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- [MSZ 12.50] Same `q_i` and zero-type payment give the same interim objects. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_eq_and_equilibriumPayoff_eq_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula    (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I)    (henvA : A.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula) (henvB : B.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula)    (i : I)    (hQ : ∀ z : ℝ, A.interimAllocProb i z = B.interimAllocProb i z)    (hM0 : A.interimExpectedPayment i 0 = B.interimExpectedPayment i 0)    (v_i : ℝ) :    A.interimExpectedPayment i v_i = B.interimExpectedPayment i v_i ∧      A.equilibriumPayoff i v_i = B.equilibriumPayoff i v_i := by  constructor  · exact      A.interimExpectedPayment_eq_of_hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_interimAllocProb_eq B        (A.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula henvA)        (B.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula henvB)        i hQ hM0 v_i  · exact      A.equilibriumPayoff_eq_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_interimAllocProb_eq B        henvA henvB i hQ hM0 v_i
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