BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport
defimported Lean
Nonnegative envelope increments on [0, ωᵢ].
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport← BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1471): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 16
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- ContinuousTypeProfileAgent-specific continuous private-value data.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 4
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos[MSZ 12.52] Supportwise IR iff zero-type payment is nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormulaUnder the interim envelope formula and nonnegative envelope increments, zero normalization implies support-restricted interim IR.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport_of_isFeasibleFeasibility gives nonnegative envelope increments on the support.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Nonnegative envelope increments on `[0, ωᵢ]`. -/ noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop := ∀ (i : I) (v_i : ℝ), 0 ≤ v_i → v_i ≤ A.typeData.omega i → 0 ≤ ∫ z in 0..v_i, A.interimAllocProb i z