BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_le_alloc_mul_sub_integral_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
IC and IR bound interim expected payment by the envelope term.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_le_alloc_mul_sub_integral_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hIC : A.IsIncentiveCompatible) (hIR : A.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport) (i : I) (v_i : ℝ) : A.interimExpectedPayment i v_i ≤ A.interimAllocProb i v_i * v_i - ∫ z in 0..v_i, A.interimAllocProb i z
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_le_alloc_mul_sub_integral_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_le_alloc_mul_sub_integral_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport← BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_le_alloc_mul_sub_integral_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1522): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 21
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupportInterim individual rationality on
[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.147] Payment identity from IC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimPaymentFormula[MSZ 12.49] Payment identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportSupportwise IR makes zero-type expected payment nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatibleInterim incentive compatibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPaymentInterim expected payment
m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupportInterim individual rationality on
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- IC and IR bound interim expected payment by the envelope term. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_le_alloc_mul_sub_integral_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hIC : A.IsIncentiveCompatible) (hIR : A.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport) (i : I) (v_i : ℝ) : A.interimExpectedPayment i v_i ≤ A.interimAllocProb i v_i * v_i - ∫ z in 0..v_i, A.interimAllocProb i z := by have hpay := A.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible hIC have hM0 := A.interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport hIR i calc A.interimExpectedPayment i v_i = A.interimExpectedPayment i 0 + A.interimAllocProb i v_i * v_i - ∫ z in 0..v_i, A.interimAllocProb i z := hpay i v_i _ ≤ A.interimAllocProb i v_i * v_i - ∫ z in 0..v_i, A.interimAllocProb i z := by linarith