BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport [Fintype I] (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hdens_ae : ∀ i : I, ∀ᵐ v ∂(volume.restrict (Set.Ioc 0 (A.typeData.omega i))), 0 ≤ A.typeDensity i v) (hint_pay : ∀ i : I, IntervalIntegrable (fun v => B.interimExpectedPayment i v * A.typeDensity i v) volume 0 (A.typeData.omega i)) (hint_env : ∀ i : I, IntervalIntegrable (fun v => (B.interimAllocProb i v * v - ∫ z in 0..v, B.interimAllocProb i z) * A.typeDensity i v) volume 0 (A.typeData.omega i)) (hIC : B.IsIncentiveCompatible) (hIR : B.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport) : A.HasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound B
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport← BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:2753): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 35
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupportInterim individual rationality on
[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBoundThe envelope-term upper bound for interim expected payments.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_le_alloc_mul_sub_integral_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportIC and IR bound interim expected payment by the envelope term.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatibleInterim incentive compatibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_pointwiseBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_pointwise
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensityAgent
i's one-dimensional density, defined as the derivative of the stored CDFFᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPaymentInterim expected payment
m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- ContinuousTypeProfileAgent-specific continuous private-value data.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport [Fintype I] (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hdens_ae : ∀ i : I, ∀ᵐ v ∂(volume.restrict (Set.Ioc 0 (A.typeData.omega i))), 0 ≤ A.typeDensity i v) (hint_pay : ∀ i : I, IntervalIntegrable (fun v => B.interimExpectedPayment i v * A.typeDensity i v) volume 0 (A.typeData.omega i)) (hint_env : ∀ i : I, IntervalIntegrable (fun v => (B.interimAllocProb i v * v - ∫ z in 0..v, B.interimAllocProb i z) * A.typeDensity i v) volume 0 (A.typeData.omega i)) (hIC : B.IsIncentiveCompatible) (hIR : B.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport) : A.HasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound B := A.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_pointwise B hdens_ae hint_pay hint_env (fun i v _h0 _homega => BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_le_alloc_mul_sub_integral_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport B hIC hIR i v)