BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatible
defimported Lean
Interim incentive compatibility.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in def BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatible (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatible`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatible← BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatible (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1051): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 16
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
U_i(t_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityInterim utility
q_i(z_i) * t_i - m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
- Used by 25
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuctionRegular Myerson optimality among feasible IC/IR mechanisms.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_interim_virtual_surplus_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_interim_virtual_surplus_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.147] Payment identity from IC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC implies monotonicity of
q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntervalIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC gives global interval integrability of
q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeIC plus the envelope derivative gives the payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimEnvelopeFormula_and_paymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.49] Envelope and payment identities from IC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_le_alloc_mul_sub_integral_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportIC and IR bound interim expected payment by the envelope term.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope from IC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatibleAt differentiable types,
U_i' = q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC makes truthful payoff convex.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeDerivative_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_equilibriumPayoff_differentiableIC and differentiability give the envelope derivative.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimEnvelopeFormula_and_paymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeEnvelope and payment identities from IC and the derivative condition.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_of_isDSICDSIC implies interim IC under interim integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptionsAnalytic assumptions for MSZ 12.59.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge[MSZ 12.48] IC iff the one-dimensional payoff inequality.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimal
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleICIRIntegrableFeasible IC/IR candidates with integrable virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_envelope_analyticBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_envelope_analytic
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Interim incentive compatibility. -/ def BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatible (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop := ∀ (i : I) (t_i z_i : ℝ), A.interimQuasiLinearUtility i t_i z_i ≤ A.equilibriumPayoff i t_i