BayesianSingleItemAuction.norm_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_le
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The constructed Myerson payment is bounded by twice the absolute report. This uses only the pointwise allocation bounds 0 ≤ x ≤ 1; it is the boundedness half of the interim-integrability proof route.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.norm_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_le [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) : ‖A.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule b i‖ ≤ 2 * ‖b i‖
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.norm_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_le`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.norm_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_le← BayesianSingleItemAuction.norm_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_le (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:1253): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 29
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleAllocates to the highest positive virtual value, otherwise withholds the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonnegBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonneg
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_le_oneBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_le_one
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRuleMyerson payment for
virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_boundFor each fixed report, the constructed Myerson payment integrand is bounded uniformly over opponent profiles.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- The constructed Myerson payment is bounded by twice the absolute report. This uses only the pointwise allocation bounds `0 ≤ x ≤ 1`; it is the boundedness half of the interim-integrability proof route. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.norm_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_le [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) : ‖A.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule b i‖ ≤ 2 * ‖b i‖ := by let x : ℝ := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule b i have hx_nonneg : 0 ≤ x := by simpa [x] using A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonneg b i have hx_le_one : x ≤ 1 := by simpa [x] using A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_le_one b i have hterm : ‖b i * A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule b i‖ ≤ ‖b i‖ := by calc ‖b i * A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule b i‖ = |b i| * x := by simp [x, Real.norm_eq_abs, abs_of_nonneg hx_nonneg] _ ≤ |b i| * 1 := mul_le_mul_of_nonneg_left hx_le_one (abs_nonneg (b i)) _ = ‖b i‖ := by simp [Real.norm_eq_abs] have hintegral : ‖∫ z in 0..b i, A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule (Function.update b i z) i‖ ≤ ‖b i‖ := by have hbound : ‖∫ z in 0..b i, A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule (Function.update b i z) i‖ ≤ 1 * |b i - 0| := intervalIntegral.norm_integral_le_of_norm_le_const (fun z _hz => by have hz_nonneg : 0 ≤ A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule (Function.update b i z) i := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonneg (Function.update b i z) i have hz_le_one : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule (Function.update b i z) i ≤ 1 := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_le_one (Function.update b i z) i simpa [Real.norm_eq_abs, abs_of_nonneg hz_nonneg] using hz_le_one) simpa [Real.norm_eq_abs] using hbound calc ‖A.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule b i‖ = ‖b i * A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule b i - ∫ z in 0..b i, A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule (Function.update b i z) i‖ := by rw [A.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq] _ ≤ ‖b i * A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule b i‖ + ‖∫ z in 0..b i, A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule (Function.update b i z) i‖ := norm_sub_le _ _ _ ≤ ‖b i‖ + ‖b i‖ := add_le_add hterm hintegral _ = 2 * ‖b i‖ := by ring