BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_bound
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
For each fixed report, the constructed Myerson payment integrand is bounded uniformly over opponent profiles.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_bound [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (i : I) (z_i : ℝ) : ∀ᵐ t ∂A.opponentPrior i, ‖A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction.interimPaymentIntegrand i z_i t‖ ≤ 2 * ‖z_i‖
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_bound`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_bound← BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_bound (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:1302): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 36
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleAllocates to the highest positive virtual value, otherwise withholds the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.norm_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_leThe constructed Myerson payment is bounded by twice the absolute report. This uses only the pointwise allocation bounds
0 ≤ x ≤ 1; it is… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanismThe virtual-surplus allocation rule paired with its Myerson payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPaymentThe single-parameter mechanism obtained by equipping an allocation rule with its canonical Myerson payment rule.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrandPayment integrand for interim payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionThe Bayesian auction using the virtual-surplus mechanism and the original priors.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRuleMyerson payment for
virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- OpponentTypeProfileOpponent type profiles for real-valued auction types.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfileThe reported type profile obtained by combining
zᵢwith an opponent profilet₋ᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPaymentThe canonical Myerson payment formula associated with an allocation rule
x. Holding all other bids fixed, agentipays… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.aestronglyMeasurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimAllocationIntegrandBayesianSingleItemAuction.aestronglyMeasurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimAllocationIntegrand
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurableOnce the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- For each fixed report, the constructed Myerson payment integrand is bounded uniformly over opponent profiles. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_bound [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (i : I) (z_i : ℝ) : ∀ᵐ t ∂A.opponentPrior i, ‖A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction.interimPaymentIntegrand i z_i t‖ ≤ 2 * ‖z_i‖ := by refine Filter.Eventually.of_forall ?_ intro t simpa [interimPaymentIntegrand, virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction, virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism, virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule, SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment, SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPayment] using A.norm_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_le (reportProfile i z_i t) i