BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The selected winner is exactly the bidder whose lexicographic virtual score dominates every other bidder's score.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner b = i ↔ ∀ j, A.virtualScore b j ≤ A.virtualScore b i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le← BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:189): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 18
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinnerThe virtual-value winner with deterministic tie-breaking.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScoreLexicographic score used to break ties among virtual values.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValueMyerson virtual value
v - (1 - F_i(v)) / f_i(v)for bidderi. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- Auction.bid_le_maxBidEvery bid is at most the argmax bidder's bid.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- The selected winner is exactly the bidder whose lexicographic virtual score dominates every other bidder's score. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner b = i ↔ ∀ j, A.virtualScore b j ≤ A.virtualScore b i := by constructor · intro hwinner j have hle : A.virtualScore b j ≤ A.virtualScore b (A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner b) := by simpa [virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner] using Auction.bid_le_maxBid (A.virtualScore b) j simpa [hwinner] using hle · intro hmax let w := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner b have hwi : A.virtualScore b w ≤ A.virtualScore b i := hmax w have hiw : A.virtualScore b i ≤ A.virtualScore b w := by simpa [w, virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner] using Auction.bid_le_maxBid (A.virtualScore b) i have hscore : A.virtualScore b w = A.virtualScore b i := le_antisymm hwi hiw have hpair : (A.virtualValue w (b w), w) = (A.virtualValue i (b i), i) := by apply toLex_inj.mp simpa [w, virtualScore] using hscore exact congrArg Prod.snd hpair