AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

The selected winner is exactly the bidder whose lexicographic virtual score dominates every other bidder's score.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BayesianSingleItemAuction in
open scoped BigOperators in
open MeasureTheory in
variable {I : Type*} in
theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le
    [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [LinearOrder I]
    (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) :
    A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner b = i ↔
      ∀ j, A.virtualScore b j ≤ A.virtualScore b i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 18
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- The selected winner is exactly the bidder whose lexicographic virtual score dominates every other bidder's score. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le    [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [LinearOrder I]    (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) :    A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner b = i ↔      ∀ j, A.virtualScore b j ≤ A.virtualScore b i := by  constructor  · intro hwinner j    have hle :        A.virtualScore b j ≤          A.virtualScore b (A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner b) := by      simpa [virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner] using        Auction.bid_le_maxBid (A.virtualScore b) j    simpa [hwinner] using hle  · intro hmax    let w := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner b    have hwi : A.virtualScore b w ≤ A.virtualScore b i := hmax w    have hiw : A.virtualScore b i ≤ A.virtualScore b w := by      simpa [w, virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner] using        Auction.bid_le_maxBid (A.virtualScore b) i    have hscore : A.virtualScore b w = A.virtualScore b i := le_antisymm hwi hiw    have hpair :        (A.virtualValue w (b w), w) = (A.virtualValue i (b i), i) := by      apply toLex_inj.mp      simpa [w, virtualScore] using hscore    exact congrArg Prod.snd hpair
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