BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in lemma BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [LinearOrder I] {X : Type*} [MeasurableSpace X] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (b : X → I → ℝ) (hb : ∀ j, Measurable fun t => A.virtualValue j (b t j)) (i : I) : MeasurableSet {t | A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (b t) = i}
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues← BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:795): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 28
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinnerThe virtual-value winner with deterministic tie-breaking.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_leThe selected winner is exactly the bidder whose lexicographic virtual score dominates every other bidder's score.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualScore_le_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualScore_le_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScoreLexicographic score used to break ties among virtual values.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValueMyerson virtual value
v - (1 - F_i(v)) / f_i(v)for bidderi. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_comp_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_comp_of_measurable_virtualValues
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} inlemma BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [LinearOrder I] {X : Type*} [MeasurableSpace X] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (b : X → I → ℝ) (hb : ∀ j, Measurable fun t => A.virtualValue j (b t j)) (i : I) : MeasurableSet {t | A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (b t) = i} := by classical haveI : Countable I := inferInstance have hset : {t | A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (b t) = i} = ⋂ j, {t | A.virtualScore (b t) j ≤ A.virtualScore (b t) i} := by ext t simp [A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_le] rw [hset] exact MeasurableSet.iInter fun j => A.measurable_virtualScore_le_of_measurable_virtualValues b hb i j