BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_pos_iff_exists_virtualValue_pos
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The winning virtual value is positive iff some virtual value is positive.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_pos_iff_exists_virtualValue_pos [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (b : I → ℝ) : 0 < A.winningVirtualValue b ↔ ∃ i, 0 < A.virtualValue i (b i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_pos_iff_exists_virtualValue_pos`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_pos_iff_exists_virtualValue_pos← BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_pos_iff_exists_virtualValue_pos (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:474): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 27
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValueThe virtual value attained by the selected virtual-value winner.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinnerThe virtual-value winner with deterministic tie-breaking.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValueMyerson virtual value
v - (1 - F_i(v)) / f_i(v)for bidderi. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_virtualValue_geThe selected winner has maximal virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 3
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winningVirtualValue_pos_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winningVirtualValue_pos_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_iff_exists_virtualValue_posA sale occurs exactly when some bidder has positive virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_iff_winningVirtualValue_posA sale occurs exactly when the selected virtual value is positive.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- The winning virtual value is positive iff some virtual value is positive. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_pos_iff_exists_virtualValue_pos [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (b : I → ℝ) : 0 < A.winningVirtualValue b ↔ ∃ i, 0 < A.virtualValue i (b i) := by constructor · intro hpos exact ⟨A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner b, by simpa [winningVirtualValue] using hpos⟩ · rintro ⟨i, hi⟩ exact lt_of_lt_of_le hi (A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_virtualValue_ge b i)