AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

CoalitionalGame.IsIndividuallyRational

defimported Lean

A payoff vector is individually rational if each player gets at least their singleton worth. Requires [LE U].

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in
variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in
def CoalitionalGame.IsIndividuallyRational [LE U] (x : PayoffVector N U) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.IsIndividuallyRational`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • CoalitionalGame.PayoffVectorA payoff vector: an assignment of payoffs to players.
  • CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility. N is the player type; U is the utility type. v assigns a worth to each coalition, with…
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in
variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in
/-- A payoff vector is individually rational if each player gets at least their singleton worth. Requires `[LE U]`. -/
def CoalitionalGame.IsIndividuallyRational [LE U] (x : PayoffVector N U) : Prop :=
  ∀ i : N, x i ≥ G.v {i}
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