AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

In a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44–4.45]

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
variable {U : Type*} in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
variable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in
variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame (Fin 2) U} in
theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq
    {c : U} (hcs : IsConstantSum G c)
    {σ τ : G.Profile}
    (hσ : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) (hτ : IsNashEquilibrium G τ) :
    G.payoff σ 0 = G.payoff τ 0
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
What was changed in EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq
--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/Basic.lean:222 (StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq)
+++ as compiled here
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
-/-- In a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0.
-    [MSZ Theorem 4.44–4.45] -/
-theorem IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq
+set_option autoImplicit true in
+set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
+open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
+variable {U : Type*} in
+set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
+variable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in
+variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame (Fin 2) U} in
+theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq
     {c : U} (hcs : IsConstantSum G c)
@@ -7,8 +12,8 @@
     G.payoff σ 0 = G.payoff τ 0 := by
-  have hcross : ∀ j : Fin 2, deviate σ 0 (τ 0) j = deviate τ 1 (σ 1) j := by
+  have hcross : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1) j := by
     intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩
-    simp only [deviate, Function.update]
+    simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update]
     have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega
     rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp
-  have hpeq : G.payoff (deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) = G.payoff (deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) :=
+  have hpeq : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) :=
     congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross)
@@ -16,16 +21,16 @@
   have h2 := hτ 1 (σ 1)
-  have hcc := hcs (deviate σ 0 (τ 0))
+  have hcc := hcs (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0))
   have hct := hcs τ
   have hge : G.payoff τ 0 ≤ G.payoff σ 0 := by
-    have heq0 : G.payoff (deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 0 :=
+    have heq0 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 0 :=
       congr_fun hpeq 0
-    have heq1 : G.payoff (deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 1 :=
+    have heq1 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 1 :=
       congr_fun hpeq 1
     linarith
-  have hcross' : ∀ j : Fin 2, deviate τ 0 (σ 0) j = deviate σ 1 (τ 1) j := by
+  have hcross' : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1) j := by
     intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩
-    simp only [deviate, Function.update]
+    simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update]
     have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega
     rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp
-  have hpeq' : G.payoff (deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) = G.payoff (deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) :=
+  have hpeq' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) :=
     congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross')
@@ -33,8 +38,8 @@
   have h4 := hσ 1 (τ 1)
-  have hcc' := hcs (deviate τ 0 (σ 0))
+  have hcc' := hcs (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0))
   have hcs' := hcs σ
   have hle : G.payoff σ 0 ≤ G.payoff τ 0 := by
-    have heq0' : G.payoff (deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 0 :=
+    have heq0' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 0 :=
       congr_fun hpeq' 0
-    have heq1' : G.payoff (deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 1 :=
+    have heq1' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 1 :=
       congr_fun hpeq' 1
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 10
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame invariable {U : Type*} inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false invariable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] invariable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame (Fin 2) U} in/-- In a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44–4.45] -/theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq    {c : U} (hcs : IsConstantSum G c)    {σ τ : G.Profile}    (hσ : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) (hτ : IsNashEquilibrium G τ) :    G.payoff σ 0 = G.payoff τ 0 := by  have hcross : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1) j := by    intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩    simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update]    have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega    rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp  have hpeq : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) :=    congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross)  have h1 := hσ 0 (τ 0)  have h2 := hτ 1 (σ 1)  have hcc := hcs (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0))  have hct := hcs τ  have hge : G.payoff τ 0 ≤ G.payoff σ 0 := by    have heq0 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 0 :=      congr_fun hpeq 0    have heq1 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 1 :=      congr_fun hpeq 1    linarith  have hcross' : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1) j := by    intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩    simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update]    have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega    rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp  have hpeq' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) :=    congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross')  have h3 := hτ 0 (σ 0)  have h4 := hσ 1 (τ 1)  have hcc' := hcs (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0))  have hcs' := hcs σ  have hle : G.payoff σ 0 ≤ G.payoff τ 0 := by    have heq0' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 0 :=      congr_fun hpeq' 0    have heq1' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 1 :=      congr_fun hpeq' 1    linarith  linarith
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