EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
In a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44–4.45]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in variable {U : Type*} in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame (Fin 2) U} in theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq {c : U} (hcs : IsConstantSum G c) {σ τ : G.Profile} (hσ : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) (hτ : IsNashEquilibrium G τ) : G.payoff σ 0 = G.payoff τ 0
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq← StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/Basic.lean:222): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/Basic.lean:222 (StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,4 +1,9 @@ -/-- In a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. - [MSZ Theorem 4.44–4.45] -/ -theorem IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +variable {U : Type*} in +set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in +variable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in +variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame (Fin 2) U} in +theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq {c : U} (hcs : IsConstantSum G c) @@ -7,8 +12,8 @@ G.payoff σ 0 = G.payoff τ 0 := by - have hcross : ∀ j : Fin 2, deviate σ 0 (τ 0) j = deviate τ 1 (σ 1) j := by + have hcross : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1) j := by intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩ - simp only [deviate, Function.update] + simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update] have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp - have hpeq : G.payoff (deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) = G.payoff (deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) := + have hpeq : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) := congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross) @@ -16,16 +21,16 @@ have h2 := hτ 1 (σ 1) - have hcc := hcs (deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) + have hcc := hcs (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) have hct := hcs τ have hge : G.payoff τ 0 ≤ G.payoff σ 0 := by - have heq0 : G.payoff (deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 0 := + have heq0 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 0 := congr_fun hpeq 0 - have heq1 : G.payoff (deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 1 := + have heq1 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 1 := congr_fun hpeq 1 linarith - have hcross' : ∀ j : Fin 2, deviate τ 0 (σ 0) j = deviate σ 1 (τ 1) j := by + have hcross' : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1) j := by intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩ - simp only [deviate, Function.update] + simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update] have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp - have hpeq' : G.payoff (deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) = G.payoff (deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) := + have hpeq' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) := congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross') @@ -33,8 +38,8 @@ have h4 := hσ 1 (τ 1) - have hcc' := hcs (deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) + have hcc' := hcs (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) have hcs' := hcs σ have hle : G.payoff σ 0 ≤ G.payoff τ 0 := by - have heq0' : G.payoff (deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 0 := + have heq0' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 0 := congr_fun hpeq' 0 - have heq1' : G.payoff (deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 1 := + have heq1' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 1 := congr_fun hpeq' 1 - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 10
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSumA two-player game is constant-sum if payoffs sum to
cat every profile. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSumA two-player game is zero-sum if payoffs sum to zero at every profile. [MSZ 4.39]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.decidableStrategicGame.IsZeroSum.decidable
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
- Used by 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq_p1In a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 1.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame invariable {U : Type*} inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false invariable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] invariable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame (Fin 2) U} in/-- In a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44–4.45] -/theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq {c : U} (hcs : IsConstantSum G c) {σ τ : G.Profile} (hσ : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) (hτ : IsNashEquilibrium G τ) : G.payoff σ 0 = G.payoff τ 0 := by have hcross : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1) j := by intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩ simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update] have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp have hpeq : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) := congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross) have h1 := hσ 0 (τ 0) have h2 := hτ 1 (σ 1) have hcc := hcs (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) have hct := hcs τ have hge : G.payoff τ 0 ≤ G.payoff σ 0 := by have heq0 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 0 := congr_fun hpeq 0 have heq1 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 1 := congr_fun hpeq 1 linarith have hcross' : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1) j := by intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩ simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update] have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp have hpeq' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) := congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross') have h3 := hτ 0 (σ 0) have h4 := hσ 1 (τ 1) have hcc' := hcs (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) have hcs' := hcs σ have hle : G.payoff σ 0 ≤ G.payoff τ 0 := by have heq0' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 0 := congr_fun hpeq' 0 have heq1' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 1 := congr_fun hpeq' 1 linarith linarith