IsNashEquilibrium
defimported Lean
A profile σ is a pure Nash equilibrium of game G if every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in def IsNashEquilibrium (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `IsNashEquilibrium`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.IsNashEquilibrium← IsNashEquilibrium (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/NashEquilibrium.lean:28): adapted
What was changed in
IsNashEquilibrium--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/NashEquilibrium.lean:28 (IsNashEquilibrium) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ -/-- A profile `σ` is a pure Nash equilibrium of game `G` if every player is playing - a best response: no player can profitably deviate. -/ -def IsNashEquilibrium (G : StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop := +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +def IsNashEquilibrium (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop := ∀ i : N, IsBestResponse G σ i - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- IsBestResponsePlayer
iis playing a best response to profileσin gameGif no unilateral deviation to any strategys'yields a higher payoff. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- IsBestResponsePlayer
- Used by 13
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eqIn a zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44-4.45]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq_p1In a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 1.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMaxNash ↔ local maximizer of ordinal potential.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq_p1In a zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 1.
- isNashEq_iffT6: The checker correctly decides Nash equilibrium (soundness and completeness).
- Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNashIf a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizableNash strategies are rationalizable.
- IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominantT3: If every player has a weakly dominant strategy and
σassigns each player their dominant strategy, thenσis a Nash equilibrium. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEqA degenerate correlated equilibrium supported on a single profile. This is the only honest correlated-equilibrium notion currently…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nashA profile maximizing an exact potential is a Nash equilibrium.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survivesNash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eqIn a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44–4.45]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.nash_iff_degenerate_ceA profile is a "degenerate" correlated equilibrium (point mass on one profile) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in /-- A profile `σ` is a pure Nash equilibrium of game `G` if every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. -/ def IsNashEquilibrium (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop := ∀ i : N, IsBestResponse G σ i