EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate
abbrevimported Lean
Unilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player i switches to s', while all other players keep their current strategies.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} in abbrev EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} [DecidableEq N] (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) (s' : G.strategy i) : G.Profile
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.deviate`
- Lean proof
- By xbei, Claude (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate← StrategicGame.deviate (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Basic.lean:53): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Basic.lean:53 (StrategicGame.deviate) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ -/-- Unilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player `i` switches to `s'`, - while all other players keep their current strategies. -/ -abbrev deviate {G : StrategicGame N U} [DecidableEq N] +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} in +abbrev EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} [DecidableEq N] (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) (s' : G.strategy i) : G.Profile := - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
- Used by 26
- IsBestResponsePlayer
iis playing a best response to profileσin gameGif no unilateral deviation to any strategys'yields a higher payoff. - IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
iplays it. - SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eqIn a zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44-4.45]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.prevSurvival at round n+1 implies survival at round n.
- IsBestResponse.congr_payoffT1: Best response depends only on player
i's payoff column. - StrictlyDominates.weaklyStrict dominance implies weak dominance.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMaxNash ↔ local maximizer of ordinal potential.
- SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSICMyerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSICPointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
- isNashEq_iffT6: The checker correctly decides Nash equilibrium (soundness and completeness).
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotentialAn exact potential function: the change in
Φequals the change in the deviating player's payoff. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotentialAn ordinal potential function: a unilateral deviation improves payoff iff it increases Φ.
- WeaklyDominatesStrategy
sweakly dominates strategys'for playeri. - IsStrictlyDominant.isWeaklyDominantA strictly dominant strategy is weakly dominant.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.SurvivesA strategy survives round
nof iterated strict dominance elimination. Round 0: all strategies survive. Round n+1:ssurvives if it… - StrictlyDominatesStrategy
sstrictly dominates strategys'for playeri. - isNashEqExecutable Nash equilibrium checker. Returns
trueiffσis a pure Nash equilibrium ofG. - Auction.FirstPrice.no_dominant_strategyNo dominant strategy exists in first-price auctions. For any bidder
iand any bidbi, there exists a profile where biddingbiis… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nashA profile maximizing an exact potential is a Nash equilibrium.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survivesNash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eqIn a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44–4.45]
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwichFor a DSIC single-parameter mechanism, fixing all other bids yields the standard two-sided bound on payment differences.
- IsBestResponsePlayer
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} in /-- Unilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player `i` switches to `s'`, while all other players keep their current strategies. -/ abbrev EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} [DecidableEq N] (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) (s' : G.strategy i) : G.Profile := Function.update σ i s'