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EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq

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A degenerate correlated equilibrium supported on a single profile. This is the only honest correlated-equilibrium notion currently formalized in this file: the mediator recommends one fixed profile with probability 1. In that case, obedience is exactly the Nash condition.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in
open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
What was changed in EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq
--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/CorrelatedEq.lean:41 (StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq)
+++ as compiled here
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-/-- A degenerate correlated equilibrium supported on a single profile.
-
-    This is the only honest correlated-equilibrium notion currently formalized
-    in this file: the mediator recommends one fixed profile with probability 1.
-    In that case, obedience is exactly the Nash condition. -/
-def IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq (G : StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop :=
+set_option autoImplicit true in
+set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
+open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
+variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in
+open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
+def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop :=
   IsNashEquilibrium G σ
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in
open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
/-- A degenerate correlated equilibrium supported on a single profile. This is the only honest correlated-equilibrium notion currently formalized in this file: the mediator recommends one fixed profile with probability 1. In that case, obedience is exactly the Nash condition. -/
def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop :=
  IsNashEquilibrium G σ
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