EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq
defimported Lean
A degenerate correlated equilibrium supported on a single profile. This is the only honest correlated-equilibrium notion currently formalized in this file: the mediator recommends one fixed profile with probability 1. In that case, obedience is exactly the Nash condition.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq← StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/CorrelatedEq.lean:41): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/CorrelatedEq.lean:41 (StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -/-- A degenerate correlated equilibrium supported on a single profile. - - This is the only honest correlated-equilibrium notion currently formalized - in this file: the mediator recommends one fixed profile with probability 1. - In that case, obedience is exactly the Nash condition. -/ -def IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq (G : StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop := +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop := IsNashEquilibrium G σ - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
- Used by 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.nash_iff_degenerate_ceA profile is a "degenerate" correlated equilibrium (point mass on one profile) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in /-- A degenerate correlated equilibrium supported on a single profile. This is the only honest correlated-equilibrium notion currently formalized in this file: the mediator recommends one fixed profile with probability 1. In that case, obedience is exactly the Nash condition. -/ def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEq (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) : Prop := IsNashEquilibrium G σ