isNashEq_iff
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
T6: The checker correctly decides Nash equilibrium (soundness and completeness).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] [DecidableRel (· ≤ · : U → U → Prop)] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in theorem isNashEq_iff [Fintype N] (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] (σ : G.Profile) : isNashEq G σ = true ↔ IsNashEquilibrium G σ
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `isNashEq_iff`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.isNashEq_iff← isNashEq_iff (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Checker.lean:30): adapted
What was changed in
isNashEq_iff--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Checker.lean:30 (isNashEq_iff) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ -/-- T6: The checker correctly decides Nash equilibrium (soundness and completeness). -/ -theorem isNashEq_iff [Fintype N] (G : StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] [DecidableRel (· ≤ · : U → U → Prop)] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +theorem isNashEq_iff [Fintype N] (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] (σ : G.Profile) : - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- IsBestResponsePlayer
iis playing a best response to profileσin gameGif no unilateral deviation to any strategys'yields a higher payoff. - IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - isNashEqExecutable Nash equilibrium checker. Returns
trueiffσis a pure Nash equilibrium ofG. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- IsBestResponsePlayer
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] [DecidableRel (· ≤ · : U → U → Prop)] inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame in/-- T6: The checker correctly decides Nash equilibrium (soundness and completeness). -/theorem isNashEq_iff [Fintype N] (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] (σ : G.Profile) : isNashEq G σ = true ↔ IsNashEquilibrium G σ := by simp [isNashEq, IsNashEquilibrium, IsBestResponse]