AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

In a zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44-4.45]

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
variable {U : Type*} in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
variable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in
variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame (Fin 2) U} in
theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq
    (hzs : IsZeroSum G) {σ τ : G.Profile}
    (hσ : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) (hτ : IsNashEquilibrium G τ) :
    G.payoff σ 0 = G.payoff τ 0
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
What was changed in EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq
--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/Basic.lean:157 (StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq)
+++ as compiled here
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
-/-- In a zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0.
-    [MSZ Theorem 4.44-4.45] -/
-theorem IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq
+set_option autoImplicit true in
+set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
+open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
+variable {U : Type*} in
+set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
+variable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in
+variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame (Fin 2) U} in
+theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq
     (hzs : IsZeroSum G) {σ τ : G.Profile}
@@ -6,9 +11,9 @@
     G.payoff σ 0 = G.payoff τ 0 := by
-  -- Cross-profile (τ₀, σ₁) = deviate σ 0 (τ 0) = deviate τ 1 (σ 1)
-  have hcross : ∀ j : Fin 2, deviate σ 0 (τ 0) j = deviate τ 1 (σ 1) j := by
+  -- Cross-profile (τ₀, σ₁) = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0) = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)
+  have hcross : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1) j := by
     intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩
-    simp only [deviate, Function.update]
+    simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update]
     have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega
     rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp
-  have hpeq : G.payoff (deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) = G.payoff (deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) :=
+  have hpeq : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) :=
     congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross)
@@ -19,3 +24,3 @@
   -- Zero-sum: convert player 1 inequality to player 0
-  have hzc := hzs.neg (deviate σ 0 (τ 0))
+  have hzc := hzs.neg (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0))
   have hzt := hzs.neg τ
@@ -23,8 +28,8 @@
   have hge : G.payoff τ 0 ≤ G.payoff σ 0 := by
-    -- hzc: payoff(cross,1) = -payoff(cross,0) where cross = deviate σ 0 (τ 0)
-    -- h2: payoff(deviate τ 1 (σ 1),1) ≤ payoff(τ,1)
-    -- hpeq: payoff(cross) = payoff(deviate τ 1 (σ 1))
-    have heq0 : G.payoff (deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 0 :=
+    -- hzc: payoff(cross,1) = -payoff(cross,0) where cross = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)
+    -- h2: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1),1) ≤ payoff(τ,1)
+    -- hpeq: payoff(cross) = payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1))
+    have heq0 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 0 :=
       congr_fun hpeq 0
-    have heq1 : G.payoff (deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 1 :=
+    have heq1 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 1 :=
       congr_fun hpeq 1
@@ -33,8 +38,8 @@
   -- Symmetric: swap σ and τ
-  have hcross' : ∀ j : Fin 2, deviate τ 0 (σ 0) j = deviate σ 1 (τ 1) j := by
+  have hcross' : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1) j := by
     intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩
-    simp only [deviate, Function.update]
+    simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update]
     have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega
     rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp
-  have hpeq' : G.payoff (deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) = G.payoff (deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) :=
+  have hpeq' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) :=
     congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross')
@@ -42,8 +47,8 @@
   have h4 := hσ 1 (τ 1)
-  have hzc' := hzs.neg (deviate τ 0 (σ 0))
+  have hzc' := hzs.neg (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0))
   have hzs' := hzs.neg σ
   have hle : G.payoff σ 0 ≤ G.payoff τ 0 := by
-    have heq0' : G.payoff (deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 0 :=
+    have heq0' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 0 :=
       congr_fun hpeq' 0
-    have heq1' : G.payoff (deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 1 :=
+    have heq1' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 1 :=
       congr_fun hpeq' 1
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 10
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame invariable {U : Type*} inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false invariable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] invariable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame (Fin 2) U} in/-- In a zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44-4.45] -/theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq    (hzs : IsZeroSum G) {σ τ : G.Profile}    (hσ : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) (hτ : IsNashEquilibrium G τ) :    G.payoff σ 0 = G.payoff τ 0 := by  -- Cross-profile (τ₀, σ₁) = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0) = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)  have hcross : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1) j := by    intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩    simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update]    have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega    rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp  have hpeq : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) :=    congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross)  -- σ₀ best-responds to σ₁: payoff(σ) ≥ payoff(τ₀, σ₁)  have h1 := hσ 0 (τ 0)  -- τ₁ best-responds to τ₀: payoff(τ,1) ≥ payoff(τ₀, σ₁, 1)  have h2 := hτ 1 (σ 1)  -- Zero-sum: convert player 1 inequality to player 0  have hzc := hzs.neg (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0))  have hzt := hzs.neg τ  -- From h2 + zero-sum: payoff(τ₀,σ₁, 0) ≥ payoff(τ, 0)  have hge : G.payoff τ 0 ≤ G.payoff σ 0 := by    -- hzc: payoff(cross,1) = -payoff(cross,0) where cross = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)    -- h2: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1),1) ≤ payoff(τ,1)    -- hpeq: payoff(cross) = payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1))    have heq0 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 0 :=      congr_fun hpeq 0    have heq1 : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 0 (τ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 1 (σ 1)) 1 :=      congr_fun hpeq 1    -- Now linarith can combine these    linarith  -- Symmetric: swap σ and τ  have hcross' : ∀ j : Fin 2, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0) j = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1) j := by    intro j; rcases j with ⟨j, hj⟩    simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, Function.update]    have : j = 0 ∨ j = 1 := by omega    rcases this with rfl | rfl <;> simp  have hpeq' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) :=    congr_arg G.payoff (funext hcross')  have h3 := hτ 0 (σ 0)  have h4 := hσ 1 (τ 1)  have hzc' := hzs.neg (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0))  have hzs' := hzs.neg σ  have hle : G.payoff σ 0 ≤ G.payoff τ 0 := by    have heq0' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 0 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 0 :=      congr_fun hpeq' 0    have heq1' : G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate τ 0 (σ 0)) 1 = G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ 1 (τ 1)) 1 :=      congr_fun hpeq' 1    linarith  linarith
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