EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.prev
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Survival at round n+1 implies survival at round n.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.prev {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {n : ℕ} {i : N} {s : G.strategy i} (h : G.Survives (n + 1) i s) : G.Survives n i s
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.Survives.prev`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.prev← StrategicGame.Survives.prev (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/IESDS.lean:49): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.prev--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/IESDS.lean:49 (StrategicGame.Survives.prev) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ -/-- Survival at round n+1 implies survival at round n. -/ -theorem Survives.prev {G : StrategicGame N U} {n : ℕ} {i : N} {s : G.strategy i} +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.prev {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {n : ℕ} {i : N} {s : G.strategy i} (h : G.Survives (n + 1) i s) : G.Survives n i s := - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none — Lean reports it depends on no axioms
- Built on 7
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.SurvivesA strategy survives round
nof iterated strict dominance elimination. Round 0: all strategies survive. Round n+1:ssurvives if it… - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
- Used by 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.monoSurvival is monotone: later rounds ⊆ earlier rounds.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in /-- Survival at round n+1 implies survival at round n. -/ theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.prev {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {n : ℕ} {i : N} {s : G.strategy i} (h : G.Survives (n + 1) i s) : G.Survives n i s := h.1