EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives
defimported Lean
A strategy survives round n of iterated strict dominance elimination. Round 0: all strategies survive. Round n+1: s survives if it survived round n and is not strictly dominated by any round-n survivor.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) : ℕ → (i : N) → G.strategy i → Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.Survives`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives← StrategicGame.Survives (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/IESDS.lean:40): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/IESDS.lean:40 (StrategicGame.Survives) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -/-- A strategy survives round `n` of iterated strict dominance elimination. - Round 0: all strategies survive. - Round n+1: `s` survives if it survived round `n` and is not strictly - dominated by any round-n survivor. -/ -def Survives (G : StrategicGame N U) : ℕ → (i : N) → G.strategy i → Prop - | 0 => fun _ _ => True +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) : ℕ → (i : N) → G.strategy i → Prop | 0 => fun _ _ => True | n + 1 => fun i s => - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
- Used by 5
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDominanceSolvableA game is dominance-solvable if IESDS yields a unique surviving profile.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.prevSurvival at round n+1 implies survival at round n.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.monoSurvival is monotone: later rounds ⊆ earlier rounds.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsRationalizableA strategy is rationalizable if it survives all rounds.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survivesNash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31]
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in /-- A strategy survives round `n` of iterated strict dominance elimination. Round 0: all strategies survive. Round n+1: `s` survives if it survived round `n` and is not strictly dominated by any round-n survivor. -/ def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) : ℕ → (i : N) → G.strategy i → Prop | 0 => fun _ _ => True | n + 1 => fun i s => G.Survives n i s ∧ ¬ ∃ t : G.strategy i, G.Survives n i t ∧ ∀ σ : G.Profile, (∀ j, G.Survives n j (σ j)) → G.payoff (deviate σ i s) i < G.payoff (deviate σ i t) i