GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn
defimported Lean
Root-scoped subgame perfection on the subtrees of a fixed root. IsSubgamePerfect σ is global over every GameTree N U. This predicate restricts the same no-profitable-deviation condition to subgames that occur inside the chosen root g.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in def GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn (σ : Strategy N U) (g : GameTree N U) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn← GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeNE.lean:61): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 13
- GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.IVariantTwo strategies are
i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned byi. I.e.,σ'is obtained fromσby changing only playeri's… - GameTree.outcomeThe outcome (terminal payoff vector) of playing strategy
σstarting from game treeg. Walks down the tree, usingσto pick a child… - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - GameTree.Subtree
Subtree s g—soccurs as a subtree ofg. - GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a
Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list. - GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- Used by 7
- GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE_onKuhn's theorem, root-scoped SPE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure strategy that is subgame-perfect…
- GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgamesIf a tree has no proper subgames, root Nash equilibrium already implies subgame perfection on that tree. This is the pure finite-tree form…
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn.toNashAtRoot-scoped subgame perfection implies Nash equilibrium at the same root.
- ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree.spe_on_to_nash_atOn any extracted tree, root-scoped subgame perfection implies root Nash equilibrium through the ordinary
GameTreeequilibrium API. - GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toSubgamePerfectOnA global subgame-perfect equilibrium is subgame-perfect on every fixed root.
- GameTree.zermelo_exists_pure_SPEPure root-scoped subgame-perfect existence for a finite two-player game on
ℚ: theFin 2/ℚinstance ofKuhn_exists_SPE_on.… - GameTree.isSubgamePerfectOn_iff_forall_subtree_isNashAtRoot-scoped subgame perfection is equivalent to Nash equilibrium at every subtree of the root. This is the pure finite-tree form of MSZ…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in /-- Root-scoped subgame perfection on the subtrees of a fixed root. `IsSubgamePerfect σ` is global over every `GameTree N U`. This predicate restricts the same no-profitable-deviation condition to subgames that occur inside the chosen root `g`. -/ def GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn (σ : Strategy N U) (g : GameTree N U) : Prop := ∀ (s : GameTree N U), Subtree s g → ∀ (i : N) (σ' : Strategy N U), IVariant i σ σ' → outcome σ' s i ≤ outcome σ s i