GameTree.IsNashAt
abbrevimported Lean
Root-scoped Nash equilibrium predicate for a fixed GameTree root. This is definitionally the existing IsNashEquilibrium, with the requested root-first API name for users who want to state equilibrium at a particular subgame rather than quantify over every subtree.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in abbrev GameTree.IsNashAt (σ : Strategy N U) (g : GameTree N U) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.IsNashAt`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.IsNashAt← GameTree.IsNashAt (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeNE.lean:53): adapted
What was changed in
GameTree.IsNashAt--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeNE.lean:53 (GameTree.IsNashAt) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -/-- Root-scoped Nash equilibrium predicate for a fixed `GameTree` root. - -This is definitionally the existing `IsNashEquilibrium`, with the requested -root-first API name for users who want to state equilibrium at a particular -subgame rather than quantify over every subtree. -/ -abbrev IsNashAt (σ : Strategy N U) (g : GameTree N U) : Prop := - IsNashEquilibrium σ g +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open GameTree in +variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in +abbrev GameTree.IsNashAt (σ : Strategy N U) (g : GameTree N U) : Prop := + GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 11
- GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.IsNashEquilibriumNash equilibrium: no single player can improve their outcome at the root game by unilateral deviation. Weaker than
IsSubgamePerfect,… - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a
Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list. - GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- Used by 4
- GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgamesIf a tree has no proper subgames, root Nash equilibrium already implies subgame perfection on that tree. This is the pure finite-tree form…
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn.toNashAtRoot-scoped subgame perfection implies Nash equilibrium at the same root.
- ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree.spe_on_to_nash_atOn any extracted tree, root-scoped subgame perfection implies root Nash equilibrium through the ordinary
GameTreeequilibrium API. - GameTree.isSubgamePerfectOn_iff_forall_subtree_isNashAtRoot-scoped subgame perfection is equivalent to Nash equilibrium at every subtree of the root. This is the pure finite-tree form of MSZ…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in /-- Root-scoped Nash equilibrium predicate for a fixed `GameTree` root. This is definitionally the existing `IsNashEquilibrium`, with the requested root-first API name for users who want to state equilibrium at a particular subgame rather than quantify over every subtree. -/ abbrev GameTree.IsNashAt (σ : Strategy N U) (g : GameTree N U) : Prop := GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g