GS.StableMatching.matchW_partner
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
GS.StableMatching.matchW_partner
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.StableMatching.matchW_partner (μ : StableMatching w m) (j : Fin n) : μ.1.matchW j = some (μ.partner j)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.StableMatching.matchW_partner`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.StableMatching.matchW_partner← GS.StableMatching.matchW_partner (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:512): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- GS.StableMatching.partnerMan
j's partner under a stable matching. - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.StableMatchingThe type of stable matchings of a one-to-one market.
- GS.StableMatching.partnerMan
- Used by 2
- GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatestThe GS output is the greatest stable matching in the men-preference order: every man weakly prefers his GS partner to his partner in…
- GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrderMen-preference order:
μ ≤ νiff every man weakly prefers hisν-partner to hisμ-partner (smalleridxOf= more preferred).
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.StableMatching.matchW_partner (μ : StableMatching w m) (j : Fin n) : μ.1.matchW j = some (μ.partner j) := matchW_wPartner μ.1 μ.2 j