GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrder
instanceimported Lean
Men-preference order: μ ≤ ν iff every man weakly prefers his ν-partner to his μ-partner (smaller idxOf = more preferred).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in instance GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrder : PartialOrder (StableMatching w m)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrder`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrder← @EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:517 (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:515): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 11
- GS.StableMatching.partnerMan
j's partner under a stable matching. - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - GS.StableMatching.matchW_partnerGS.StableMatching.matchW_partner
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.StableMatchingThe type of stable matchings of a one-to-one market.
- GS.pref_list_memEvery element of
Fin nappears in a full-permutation list.
- GS.StableMatching.partnerMan
- Used by 4
- GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatestThe GS output is the greatest stable matching in the men-preference order: every man weakly prefers his GS partner to his partner in…
- GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest
gsStableis the greatest element of the stable-matching lattice. - GS.StableMatching.gsStableThe men-proposing Gale–Shapley output, as an element of the lattice of stable matchings.
- GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in /-- Men-preference order: `μ ≤ ν` iff every man weakly prefers his `ν`-partner to his `μ`-partner (smaller `idxOf` = more preferred). -/ instance GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrder : PartialOrder (StableMatching w m) where le μ ν := ∀ j : Fin n, (m.prefs j).idxOf (ν.partner j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf (μ.partner j) le_refl _ _ := le_refl _ le_trans _ _ _ h1 h2 j := le_trans (h2 j) (h1 j) le_antisymm μ ν h1 h2 := by have hpart : ∀ j, μ.partner j = ν.partner j := fun j => (List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (m.valid j).1 (m.valid j).2 _)).mp (le_antisymm (h2 j) (h1 j)) apply Subtype.ext apply Matching.ext · funext i apply Option.ext; intro k rw [μ.1.consistent i k, ν.1.consistent i k, matchW_partner μ k, matchW_partner ν k, hpart k] · funext j rw [matchW_partner μ j, matchW_partner ν j, hpart j]