GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatest
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The GS output is the greatest stable matching in the men-preference order: every man weakly prefers his GS partner to his partner in any other stable matching. This is galeShapley_isProposingOptimal packaged as the lattice maximum (⊤-like greatest element).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS GS.StableMatching in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in theorem GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatest [NeZero n] (μ : StableMatching w m) : μ ≤ gsStable w m
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatest`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatest← GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatest (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:568): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 17
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - GS.StableMatchingThe type of stable matchings of a one-to-one market.
- GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrderMen-preference order:
μ ≤ νiff every man weakly prefers hisν-partner to hisμ-partner (smalleridxOf= more preferred). - GS.StableMatching.gsStableThe men-proposing Gale–Shapley output, as an element of the lattice of stable matchings.
- GS.StableMatching.partnerMan
j's partner under a stable matching. - GS.gsThe Gale-Shapley function: woman
j's partner at termination. - gs_bijective
gs w mis a bijection onFin n. - GS.galeShapley_isProposingOptimalMen-optimal stable matching (Gale–Shapley 1962, [MSZ 22.10]): in the men-proposing DA, every man's GS partner is at least as preferred…
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.StableMatching.matchW_partnerGS.StableMatching.matchW_partner
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…
- MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market.
MandWare the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference…
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
- Used by 1
- GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest
gsStableis the greatest element of the stable-matching lattice.
- GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS GS.StableMatching inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in/-- **The GS output is the greatest stable matching** in the men-preference order: every man weakly prefers his GS partner to his partner in any other stable matching. This is `galeShapley_isProposingOptimal` packaged as the lattice maximum (`⊤`-like greatest element). -/theorem GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatest [NeZero n] (μ : StableMatching w m) : μ ≤ gsStable w m := by intro j show (m.prefs j).idxOf ((gsStable w m).partner j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf (μ.partner j) have hg : (gsStable w m).partner j = (Equiv.ofBijective (gs w m) (gs_bijective w m)).symm j := rfl rw [hg] exact galeShapley_isProposingOptimal w m μ.1 μ.2 j (μ.partner j) (matchW_partner μ j)