GS.meetMan_injective
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
GS.meetMan_injective
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.meetMan_injective : Function.Injective (meetMan μ ν hμ hν)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.meetMan_injective`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.meetMan_injective← GS.meetMan_injective (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:388): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.meetMan_mem_womenGS.meetMan_mem_women
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.meetManWoman
i's more-preferred man acrossμandν. - GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man
junder a stable matchingμ(total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect). - GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - GS.meetMan_worse_rightGS.meetMan_worse_right
- GS.meetMan_worse_leftGS.meetMan_worse_left
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.pref_list_memEvery element of
Fin nappears in a full-permutation list.
- Used by 1
- GS.meetEquivThe meet man-assignment packaged as an equivalence.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) inlemma GS.meetMan_injective : Function.Injective (meetMan μ ν hμ hν) := by intro i1 i2 he set j := meetMan μ ν hμ hν i1 with hjdef have h1 : meetMan μ ν hμ hν i1 = j := hjdef.symm have h2 : meetMan μ ν hμ hν i2 = j := he.symm.trans hjdef.symm rcases meetMan_mem_women μ ν hμ hν h1 with hm1 | hn1 <;> rcases meetMan_mem_women μ ν hμ hν h2 with hm2 | hn2 · exact hm1.symm.trans hm2 · have a := meetMan_worse_left μ ν hμ hν h1 hm1 have b := meetMan_worse_right μ ν hμ hν h2 hn2 rw [hn2] at a; rw [hm1] at b exact (List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (m.valid j).1 (m.valid j).2 i1)).mp (le_antisymm b a) · have a := meetMan_worse_right μ ν hμ hν h1 hn1 have b := meetMan_worse_left μ ν hμ hν h2 hm2 rw [hm2] at a; rw [hn1] at b exact (List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (m.valid j).1 (m.valid j).2 i1)).mp (le_antisymm b a) · exact hn1.symm.trans hn2