AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GS.meetMan_worse_left

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

GS.meetMan_worse_left

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in
lemma GS.meetMan_worse_left {i j : Fin n}
    (hij : meetMan μ ν hμ hν i = j) (hμij : wPartner μ hμ j = i) :
    (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GS.meetMan_worse_left`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 13
  • GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman i under a stable matching μ.
  • Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
  • MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between M and W. matchM i is the partner of i ∈ M (or none if unmatched). matchW j is the…
  • GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
  • GS.meetManWoman i's more-preferred man across μ and ν.
  • GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man j under a stable matching μ (total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect).
  • GS.wPartner_eq_iffThe man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
  • GS.PreferencesList-based preferences: prefs i is a full permutation of Fin n, ordered from most to least preferred.
  • GS.opposed_preferences_womenDual of opposed_preferences: if woman i strictly prefers man mi to her candidate-man mi', then mi strictly prefers his…
  • MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n) from list-based preference data. some j ≻ some k iff j appears earlier in the list; none is…
  • GS.pref_list_memEvery element of Fin n appears in a full-permutation list.
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) inlemma GS.meetMan_worse_left {i j : Fin n}    (hij : meetMan μ ν hμ hν i = j) (hμij : wPartner μ hμ j = i) :    (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf i := by  have hμm : mPartner μ hμ i = j := (wPartner_eq_iff μ hμ).mp hμij  by_cases heq : mPartner ν hν i = j  · have : wPartner ν hν j = i := (wPartner_eq_iff ν hν).mpr heq    rw [this]  · have hbranch : meetMan μ ν hμ hν i = mPartner μ hμ i := by rw [hij, hμm]    have hle : (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner μ hμ i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner ν hν i) := by      by_contra hgt      unfold meetMan at hbranch      rw [if_neg hgt] at hbranch      exact heq (hbranch.trans hμm)    rw [hμm] at hle    have hlt : (w.prefs i).idxOf j < (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner ν hν i) := by      refine lt_of_le_of_ne hle (fun e => heq ?_)      exact ((List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (w.valid i).1 (w.valid i).2 j)).mp e).symm    have := opposed_preferences_women ν hν (mi := j) (mi' := mPartner ν hν i)      (j' := wPartner ν hν j) (matchM_mPartner ν hν i) hlt (matchW_wPartner ν hν j)    omega
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