GS.meetMan_worse_left
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
GS.meetMan_worse_left
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.meetMan_worse_left {i j : Fin n} (hij : meetMan μ ν hμ hν i = j) (hμij : wPartner μ hμ j = i) : (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.meetMan_worse_left`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.meetMan_worse_left← GS.meetMan_worse_left (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:347): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
iunder a stable matchingμ. - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.meetManWoman
i's more-preferred man acrossμandν. - GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man
junder a stable matchingμ(total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect). - GS.wPartner_eq_iffThe man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - GS.opposed_preferences_womenDual of
opposed_preferences: if womanistrictly prefers manmito hercandidate-manmi', thenmistrictly prefers his… - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.pref_list_memEvery element of
Fin nappears in a full-permutation list.
- GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
- Used by 2
- GS.stableMeet_ge_rightGS.stableMeet_ge_right
- GS.meetMan_injectiveGS.meetMan_injective
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) inlemma GS.meetMan_worse_left {i j : Fin n} (hij : meetMan μ ν hμ hν i = j) (hμij : wPartner μ hμ j = i) : (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf i := by have hμm : mPartner μ hμ i = j := (wPartner_eq_iff μ hμ).mp hμij by_cases heq : mPartner ν hν i = j · have : wPartner ν hν j = i := (wPartner_eq_iff ν hν).mpr heq rw [this] · have hbranch : meetMan μ ν hμ hν i = mPartner μ hμ i := by rw [hij, hμm] have hle : (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner μ hμ i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner ν hν i) := by by_contra hgt unfold meetMan at hbranch rw [if_neg hgt] at hbranch exact heq (hbranch.trans hμm) rw [hμm] at hle have hlt : (w.prefs i).idxOf j < (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner ν hν i) := by refine lt_of_le_of_ne hle (fun e => heq ?_) exact ((List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (w.valid i).1 (w.valid i).2 j)).mp e).symm have := opposed_preferences_women ν hν (mi := j) (mi' := mPartner ν hν i) (j' := wPartner ν hν j) (matchM_mPartner ν hν i) hlt (matchW_wPartner ν hν j) omega