GS.wPartner
defimported Lean
The woman partnered to man j under a stable matching μ (total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in noncomputable def GS.wPartner (μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (j : Fin n) : Fin n
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `GS.wPartner`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.wPartner← GS.wPartner (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:84): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.stable_matching_perfectIn the balanced full-preference one-to-one market, every stable matching is perfect: every woman and every man is matched. This is the…
- Used by 22
- GS.joinWoman_le_rightGS.joinWoman_le_right
- GS.joinWoman_mem_menIf
iis manj's join-partner thenjis one ofi's two men. - GS.StableMatching.partnerMan
j's partner under a stable matching. - GS.stableMeet_isStableThe meet of two stable matchings is stable.
- GS.stableMeet_ge_leftGS.stableMeet_ge_left
- GS.meetEquiv_symm_eq_orThe meet woman of man
jis one of his two partners (his worse). - GS.stableMeet_ge_rightGS.stableMeet_ge_right
- GS.wPartner_stableMeetGS.wPartner_stableMeet
- GS.joinWoman_worse_rightDual of
joinWoman_worse_leftwith the roles ofμ,νswapped. - GS.meetMan_mem_womenGS.meetMan_mem_women
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.wPartner_stableJoinGS.wPartner_stableJoin
- GS.joinWoman_le_leftGS.joinWoman_le_left
- GS.stableJoin_isStableThe join of two stable matchings is stable.
- GS.wPartner_eq_iffThe man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
- GS.meetMan_worse_rightGS.meetMan_worse_right
- GS.meetMan_worse_leftGS.meetMan_worse_left
- GS.joinWoman_worse_leftIf
iis the join-partner of herμ-manj, theniweakly prefers herν-man toj(sojis her worse man). - GS.joinWoman_eq_orGS.joinWoman_eq_or
- GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…
- GS.joinWomanMan
j's more-preferred partner across stable matchingsμandν. - GS.meetMan_injectiveGS.meetMan_injective
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in /-- The woman partnered to man `j` under a stable matching `μ` (total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect). -/ noncomputable def GS.wPartner (μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (j : Fin n) : Fin n := (μ.matchW j).get ((stable_matching_perfect w m μ hμ).2 j)