AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GS.stableMeet

defimported Lean

The meet μ ∧ ν: each woman keeps her more-preferred man; each man keeps his less-preferred woman.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in
noncomputable def GS.stableMeet : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)
Defined in
EconCSLib, `GS.stableMeet`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 9
Used by 5

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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in
/-- The **meet** `μ ∧ ν`: each woman keeps her more-preferred man; each man keeps his less-preferred woman. -/
noncomputable def GS.stableMeet : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n) where
  matchM i := some (meetMan μ ν hμ hν i)
  matchW j := some ((meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm j)
  consistent := by
    intro i j
    simp only [Option.some.injEq]
    rw [Equiv.symm_apply_eq]
    exact eq_comm
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