GS.wPartner_stableMeet
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
GS.wPartner_stableMeet
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.wPartner_stableMeet (j : Fin n) : wPartner (stableMeet μ ν hμ hν) (stableMeet_isStable μ ν hμ hν) j = (meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm j
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.wPartner_stableMeet`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.wPartner_stableMeet← GS.wPartner_stableMeet (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:471): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- GS.stableMeet_isStableThe meet of two stable matchings is stable.
- GS.stableMeetThe meet
μ ∧ ν: each woman keeps her more-preferred man; each man keeps his less-preferred woman. - GS.stableMeet_matchMGS.stableMeet_matchM
- GS.stableMeet_matchWGS.stableMeet_matchW
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man
junder a stable matchingμ(total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect). - GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - GS.meetEquivThe meet man-assignment packaged as an equivalence.
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.wPartner_stableMeet (j : Fin n) : wPartner (stableMeet μ ν hμ hν) (stableMeet_isStable μ ν hμ hν) j = (meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm j := rfl