GS.stableMeet_matchM
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
GS.stableMeet_matchM
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in @[simp] lemma GS.stableMeet_matchM (i : Fin n) : (stableMeet μ ν hμ hν).matchM i = some (meetMan μ ν hμ hν i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.stableMeet_matchM`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.stableMeet_matchM← GS.stableMeet_matchM (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:424): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- GS.stableMeetThe meet
μ ∧ ν: each woman keeps her more-preferred man; each man keeps his less-preferred woman. - MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.meetManWoman
i's more-preferred man acrossμandν. - GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis…
- Used by 9
- GS.stableMeet_isStableThe meet of two stable matchings is stable.
- GS.stableMeet_matchWGS.stableMeet_matchW
- GS.stableMeet_ge_leftGS.stableMeet_ge_left
- GS.meetEquiv_symm_eq_orThe meet woman of man
jis one of his two partners (his worse). - GS.meetMan_le_leftGS.meetMan_le_left
- GS.stableMeet_ge_rightGS.stableMeet_ge_right
- GS.wPartner_stableMeetGS.wPartner_stableMeet
- GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…
- GS.meetMan_le_rightGS.meetMan_le_right
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in @[simp] lemma GS.stableMeet_matchM (i : Fin n) : (stableMeet μ ν hμ hν).matchM i = some (meetMan μ ν hμ hν i) := rfl