GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgames
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If a tree has no proper subgames, root Nash equilibrium already implies subgame perfection on that tree. This is the pure finite-tree form of MSZ Theorem 7.4.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in theorem GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgames {σ : Strategy N U} {g : GameTree N U} (hnash : IsNashAt σ g) (hsubgames : HasOnlyRootSubgames g) : IsSubgamePerfectOn σ g
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgames`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgames← GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgames (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeNE.lean:99): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 16
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOnRoot-scoped subgame perfection on the subtrees of a fixed root.
IsSubgamePerfect σis global over everyGameTree N U. This predicate… - GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.IsNashAtRoot-scoped Nash equilibrium predicate for a fixed
GameTreeroot. This is definitionally the existingIsNashEquilibrium, with the… - GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.IVariantTwo strategies are
i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned byi. I.e.,σ'is obtained fromσby changing only playeri's… - GameTree.outcomeThe outcome (terminal payoff vector) of playing strategy
σstarting from game treeg. Walks down the tree, usingσto pick a child… - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - GameTree.HasOnlyRootSubgamesA fixed
GameTreehas no proper subgames when every subtree is the root itself. This is the pure finite-tree analogue of having no… - GameTree.Subtree
Subtree s g—soccurs as a subtree ofg. - GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a
Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list. - GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOnRoot-scoped subgame perfection on the subtrees of a fixed root.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GameTree invariable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in/-- If a tree has no proper subgames, root Nash equilibrium already implies subgame perfection on that tree. This is the pure finite-tree form of MSZ Theorem 7.4. -/theorem GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgames {σ : Strategy N U} {g : GameTree N U} (hnash : IsNashAt σ g) (hsubgames : HasOnlyRootSubgames g) : IsSubgamePerfectOn σ g := by intro s hsg i σ' hiv have hs : s = g := hsubgames s hsg subst hs exact hnash i σ' hiv