AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgames

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

If a tree has no proper subgames, root Nash equilibrium already implies subgame perfection on that tree. This is the pure finite-tree form of MSZ Theorem 7.4.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GameTree in
variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in
theorem GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgames
    {σ : Strategy N U} {g : GameTree N U}
    (hnash : IsNashAt σ g) (hsubgames : HasOnlyRootSubgames g) :
    IsSubgamePerfectOn σ g
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgames`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 16
  • GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOnRoot-scoped subgame perfection on the subtrees of a fixed root. IsSubgamePerfect σ is global over every GameTree N U. This predicate…
  • GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
  • GameTree.IsNashAtRoot-scoped Nash equilibrium predicate for a fixed GameTree root. This is definitionally the existing IsNashEquilibrium, with the…
  • GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
  • GameTree.IVariantTwo strategies are i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned by i. I.e., σ' is obtained from σ by changing only player i's…
  • GameTree.outcomeThe outcome (terminal payoff vector) of playing strategy σ starting from game tree g. Walks down the tree, using σ to pick a child…
  • TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where ≤ is total (complete). This is weaker than LinearOrder — it does NOT require antisymmetry or…
  • GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context (mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its…
  • GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. * Leaf payoff — a terminal state with a payoff vector N → U. *…
  • GameTree.HasOnlyRootSubgamesA fixed GameTree has no proper subgames when every subtree is the root itself. This is the pure finite-tree analogue of having no…
  • GameTree.SubtreeSubtree s g — s occurs as a subtree of g.
  • GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list.
  • GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
  • GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
  • GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
  • GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GameTree invariable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in/-- If a tree has no proper subgames, root Nash equilibrium already implies subgame perfection on that tree. This is the pure finite-tree form of MSZ Theorem 7.4. -/theorem GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgames    {σ : Strategy N U} {g : GameTree N U}    (hnash : IsNashAt σ g) (hsubgames : HasOnlyRootSubgames g) :    IsSubgamePerfectOn σ g := by  intro s hsg i σ' hiv  have hs : s = g := hsubgames s hsg  subst hs  exact hnash i σ' hiv
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