AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium

defimported Lean

Nash equilibrium: no single player can improve their outcome at the root game by unilateral deviation. Weaker than IsSubgamePerfect, which demands optimality at every subtree.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GameTree in
variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in
def GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium (σ : Strategy N U) (g : GameTree N U) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 12
  • GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
  • GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
  • GameTree.IVariantTwo strategies are i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned by i. I.e., σ' is obtained from σ by changing only player i's…
  • GameTree.outcomeThe outcome (terminal payoff vector) of playing strategy σ starting from game tree g. Walks down the tree, using σ to pick a child…
  • TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where ≤ is total (complete). This is weaker than LinearOrder — it does NOT require antisymmetry or…
  • GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context (mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its…
  • GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. * Leaf payoff — a terminal state with a payoff vector N → U. *…
  • GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list.
  • GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
  • GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
  • GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
  • GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
Used by 4
  • GameTree.zermelo_exists_pure_NEPure root Nash existence for a finite two-player game on ℚ: the Fin 2 / ℚ instance of Kuhn_exists_NE. Zero-sum is not needed.
  • GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NEKuhn's theorem, NE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
  • GameTree.IsNashAtRoot-scoped Nash equilibrium predicate for a fixed GameTree root. This is definitionally the existing IsNashEquilibrium, with the…
  • GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNESPE ⇒ NE: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (at any fixed root game).

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GameTree in
variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in
/-- **Nash equilibrium**: no single player can improve their outcome at the root game by unilateral deviation. Weaker than `IsSubgamePerfect`, which demands optimality at every subtree. -/
def GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium (σ : Strategy N U) (g : GameTree N U) : Prop :=
  ∀ (i : N) (σ' : Strategy N U),
    IVariant i σ σ' → outcome σ' g i ≤ outcome σ g i
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