AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Kuhn's theorem (existence form): every finite perfect-information game without chance admits a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The backward-induction strategy optStrategy is such an SPE.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GameTree in
variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in
theorem GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE [DecidableLE U] : ∃ σ : Strategy N U, IsSubgamePerfect σ
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 13
Used by 2
  • GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE_onKuhn's theorem, root-scoped SPE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure strategy that is subgame-perfect…
  • GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NEKuhn's theorem, NE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GameTree in
variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in
/-- **Kuhn's theorem** (existence form): every finite perfect-information game without chance admits a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The backward-induction strategy `optStrategy` is such an SPE. -/
theorem GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE [DecidableLE U] : ∃ σ : Strategy N U, IsSubgamePerfect σ :=
  ⟨optStrategy, optStrategy_isSubgamePerfect⟩
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