GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Kuhn's theorem (existence form): every finite perfect-information game without chance admits a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The backward-induction strategy optStrategy is such an SPE.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in theorem GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE [DecidableLE U] : ∃ σ : Strategy N U, IsSubgamePerfect σ
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE← GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeSPE.lean:199): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.optStrategy_isSubgamePerfectOptimality of
optStrategy: for every subtreeg, every playeri, and everyi-variant deviationσ', the deviating outcome is… - GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectA strategy is subgame-perfect (SPE) if, at every subtree, no player can strictly improve their payoff by a unilateral deviation —…
- GameTree.optStrategyThe canonical backward-induction strategy: at each node, pick a child whose backward-induction value equals the node's value (i.e., a…
- TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a
Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list. - GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- Used by 2
- GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE_onKuhn's theorem, root-scoped SPE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure strategy that is subgame-perfect…
- GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NEKuhn's theorem, NE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in /-- **Kuhn's theorem** (existence form): every finite perfect-information game without chance admits a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The backward-induction strategy `optStrategy` is such an SPE. -/ theorem GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE [DecidableLE U] : ∃ σ : Strategy N U, IsSubgamePerfect σ := ⟨optStrategy, optStrategy_isSubgamePerfect⟩